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TEXTUALISM AND TABOO: INTERPRETATION
AND DEFERENCE FOR JUSTICE SCALIA
Michael Hen*
Under the big bang theory of creation, the universe is the prod
uct of a gigantic explosion, before which there was neither time nor
space. It is meaningless to ask what produced the big bang.' This is
also Antonin Scalia's view of the United States Code. The statute
exists—it is meaningless to ask what produced it. History begins only
with the big bang, just as a statute's history begins only with its enact
ment. "Legislative history" thus does not exist. Or perhaps the more
precise analogy is to the formation of matter in the initial chaos: mat
ter and statutes are both the product of a disordered, incoherent, un
conscious, anarchic sequence of events.^ Justice Scalia trusts
statutory text, not the process of its creation.
This view is of course most apparent in Justice Scalia's textualist
approach to statutory interpretation. For Scalia, the only legitimate
basis for statutory interpretation is the text itself (understood broadly
to include statutory provisions not immediately before the court).
Statutory purposes and history, as well as general policy considera
tions, are oflF-limits.^ Some of the same attitude also underlies the
other prominent aspect of Justice Scalia's approach to statutory inter
pretation: his endorsement of a strong version of judicial deference to
agency interpretation of ambiguous statutes. Justice Scalia is a fierce,
sometimes strident defender of Chevron.*
* Assistant Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I thank Marci Hamilton for
helpful comments on an earlier draft.
• "A veil of ignorance hangs over the moment of creation. Theory-builders have tried to
peer behind it, but none agrees on what they see, nor on ways of telling which of their glimpses
is true." The Big Picture, ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 1991, at 65.
2 Immediately after its creation, the universe "was small, immensely hot and filled with a
dense soup of the fundamental particles: quarks (which are heavy) and leptons (which are
light)." Id. This might fairly describe Justice Scalia's view of Congress, although I am not sure
which house he would say is composed of quarks and which of leptons.
3 H.J., Inc. V. Nothwestem Bell Tel., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2907 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Sable Communications v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2840 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); CTS
Corp. V. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 96 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); Hirschey
V. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring); Zeppos, Justice Scalia's
Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1615 (1991) [hereinaf
ter Zeppos, Scalia's Textualism],
4 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Justice Scalia's watchfulness over
any backsliding from Chevron was most apparent in his concurring opinion in INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). See also Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S.
354, 378-83 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of
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Textualism and deference are both justified as means to ensure
that judges do not engage in the great taboo: policy-making. Yet,
their coexistence should be uneasy. Part I of this Comment questions
whether a textualist can accept Chevron and examines the tensions
between these two approaches. Part II then considers the separation
of powers consequences of this combination of views.
I.

CAN

A TEXTUALIST

ACCEPT CHEVRON 1

Chevron limits the scope of a court's inquiry into statutory mean
ing,' textualism the basis on which it conducts the inquiry. They are
united in purporting to cabin judicial discretion. Nonetheless, their
interrelation is problematic.

A. Text
The first difficulty Chevron should present for the textualist is
that it lacks a textual peg. The decision's underlying theory is that
agency interpretations are binding when Congress has delegated the
interpretive task to the agency rather than to the courts®—"Congress
has transferred discretion to the agency[, which] has been deputized
to make a rule.'" This view of the theoretical underpinning of Chev
ron deference is now commonplace® and is shared by Justice Scalia.'
If the Chevron rule is the product of congressional directive, then
one would expect the textualist to feel the need for, and be able to
find, the statutory text containing that directive. Congress does some
times explicitly assign an agency the task of fleshing out vague statuPower in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 455 (1989) ("the appointment of
Justice Scalia added an even more determined proponent of Chevron and the deferential
model."); Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of LMW, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511.

' Chevron divides review of an agency's construction of a statute into two steps. "First,
always, is the question of whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter . ..." 467 U.S. at 842. This is
step one. Where "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute." Id. at 843. This is step two. Thus, where Congress "has explicitly left a gap for
the agency to fill,. .. [s]uch legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. at 843-44. Even if the gap is
implicit, merely the result of ambiguous language, the court may not substitute its policy judg
ment for that of the agency. Id. at 844.
6 Id. at 865-66; see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 110 S.Ct. 1384, 1390-91 (1990).
7 Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook,
J.).
8 E.g., Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and Courts?, 1 YALE
J. ON REG. 1, 31-32 (1990).
9 Crandon v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 997, 1011 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Scalia,
supra note 4, at 516-17.
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tory terms through binding rules. In such circumstances, Chevron
deference rests on firm textualist ground; indeed, it long predates the
decision in ChevronMore often, however. Chevron is called into
play when Congress has not made an explicit delegation, but has
merely used ambiguous language. The striking aspect of Chevron is
that it treats ambiguity itself as a congressional delegation. To infer a
delegation from merely ambiguous language necessarily goes beyond
the four comers of the statute and is therefore at odds with the textu
alist method, which looks not to what Congress meant or intended,
but only to what it did, as expressed in the text. But the Clean Air
Act, for example, contains no such explicit delegation of authority to
the EPA to make a binding determination of the meaning of the am
biguous term "new source.""
There may be excellent reasons for treating agency interpreta
tions of vague statutory language as binding: doing so places policy
making in a more democratically accountable branch, forces Congress
to make hard decisions and legislate with thought and precision, leads
to national uniformity of federal law, produces more sensible results
as experts update the statute or apply it in unforeseen circumstances,
and so on." But these justifications should all be irrelevant to the
1° Explicit delegations can be seen, for example, in the statutes involved in two oft-cited
"deference" cases: Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 419 (1977) (child's benefits hinged in
part on whether father was unable to care for child by reason of "unemployment (as deter
mined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary)"), and Addison v. Holly Hill
Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944) (minimum wage requirement does not apply to those
within the "area of production (as defined by the Administrator) engaged in handling" agricul
tural commodities). See also Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1982) (where statute called
for benefits eligibility determinations to " 'tak[e] into account only such income and resources
as are, as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the
applicant'," regulations had " 'legislative effect' ") (emphasis in original); Schweiker v. Gray
Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981); INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (construing 8
U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1976)).
> I This was the issue in Chevron itself. The statute imposes fairly stringent air pollution
control requirements on "new ... sources" in areas with air that does not meet federal ambient
standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(bX6) (1982). "New source" is left undefined. The EPA issued a
rule under which a new installation would not be deemed a "new source" if the plant in which
it was installed made offsetting reductions at other points. Under this approach the entire
plant is deemed a single source, as if covered by a huge bubble. As long as there is no increase
in pollution from a vent at the top of this imaginary bubble, the new source requirements are
not triggered. The lawsuit was a challenge to this interpretation of the statutory term.
The Act nowhere assigns interpretive authority to the agency; the Administrator is merely
"authorized to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his function under this
chapter." Id. § 7601 (a)(1). The Court made no effort to ground its approach in any provision
of the Clean Air Act. To the contrary, it expressly stated that it does not matter whether or
not Congress "consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level" of
specificity. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66; Moglen & Pierce, Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing
the Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. Cm. L. REV. 1203, 1213-14 (1990); Starr, Judi-
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textualist if Congress has not taken them to heart in the statute. In
deed, Justice Scalia has acknowledged that the Chevron approach
does not actually rest on congressional directive.
It is beyond the scope of these remarks to defend that presumption
[that where the statute is ambiguous Congress intended to delegate
interpretive authority] .... Surely, however, it is a more rational
presumption today than it would have been thirty years ago . . . .
And to tell the truth, the quest for the "genuine" legislative intent
is probably a wild-goose chase anyway. In the vast majority of
cases I expect that Congress neither (1) intended a single result,
nor (2) meant to confer discretion upon the agency, but rather (3)
didn't think about the matter at all. If I am correct in that, then
any rule adopted in this field represents merely a fictional, pre
sumed intent, and operates principally as a background rule of law
against which Congress can legislate.'^
It is strange to see the textualist indulge in such fictionalized pre
sumptions about congressional intent rather than grounding the dele
gation in some actual statutory language. In this respect. Chevron is
directly counter to the textualist creed. Chevron says that when Con
gress has been ambiguous and has not thought about where to place
interpretive authority, the Court will indulge a fictional presumption
that Congress meant to delegate that authority to the agency because
the Court thinks that is what Congress should have done (or would
have done if it had thought about it?). That is a far cry from the
textualist model.
Justice Scalia's response, implicit in the quote excerpted above,
would be that given congressional silence it is equally hypothetical to
presume a congressional intent that the courts are to do the interpret
ing; since Congress "didn't think about the matter at all,""^ the court
must choose between judicially established default rules, and Chevron
is preferable to the alternative. Congress can always overcome the
presumption if it doesn't like it. Yet the choice is not between two
equally judge-made, fictional background rules. First, Congress has
spoken. The Administrative Procedure Act (A?A) assigns the inter
pretive task to the courts: in reviewing agency action (which is what
Chevron cases usually involve), the court "shall decide all relevant
questions of law, [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provicial Review in the Pos/-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 309-12 (1986); Strauss, One
Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121-22 (1987) [hereinafter
Strauss, 150 Cases],
'3 Scalia, supra note 4, at 516-17 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 517.
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sions.'"' Justice Scalia endorses far-ranging searches into other parts
of the United States Code for illumination of ambiguous statutory
terms.If the United States Code is to be read as a unified whole,
then, notwithstanding the silence of any particular piece of ambiguous
legislation. Congress has clearly and explicitly assigned the interpre
tive function to the courts.'"' This reading seems especially compel
ling because the APA states that a "[sjubsequent statute may not be
held to supersede or modify [the Act] except to the extent it does so
expressly.'"®
Second, the Chevron approach is counter-intuitive, at least if
one's intuitions are the product of the frequent incantation of our
lawyers' and judges' national anthem,"" John Marshall's admonition
that it is the duty of the judicial department to "say what the law
is."^° All other things being equal (as they are in the case of utter
congressional silence) the interpretive task falls to the courts, not the
agencies. Justice Scalia himself has taken this judicial role for granted
in rejecting reliance on postenactment legislative history.^'
Third, were one to speculate about what a silent Congress might
have wanted, it would seem that Congress should in general prefer
stricter judicial review. After all, our system is designed so that the
15 5 U.S.C § 706 (1988).
>6 See, e.g.. Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368 (1987); Zeppos, Scalia's Textualism,supra note
3, at 1615, 1621-22.
f I do not mean that § 706 shows that Chevron is wrong. Most readers can square the
two. See, e.g.. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
549, 570-71 (1985). But most readers are not textualists. My point is only that it should be
hard for Justice Scalia to square them.
>8 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1988).

19 W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, P. STRAUSS, T. RAKOFF & R. SCHOTLAND, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 401 n.4 (8th ed. 1987).

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
21 Rejecting any reliance on a 1985 House Report pertaining to an amendment to the 1980
Equal Access to Justice Act, Justice Scalia wrote:
If this langiiagp is to be controlling upon us, it must be either (1) an authoritative
interpretation of what the 1980 statute meant, or (2) an authoritative interpreta
tion of what the 1985 Congress intended. It cannot, of course, be the former, since
it is the function of the courts and not the Legislature, much less a Committee of
one House of the Legislature, to say what an enacted statute means.
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 (1988). I recognize that delegation to an agency
stands on quite different constitutional footing than delegation to a part of Congress. See
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); id. at 736 (Stevens, J., concurring); INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 953 n.l6 (1983). One could plausibly hold different views of the appropriate
judical stance toward agency interpretations and postenactment legislative history. Nor would
one expect Justice Scalia to discuss agency interpretations in the context of this particular
l>gi«iatinn My point is only that Scalia, like all law school graduates, begins with the pre
sumption that it is the courts who pin down the meaning of vague statutory terms. He did not
say that "it is the function of the agencies and the courts to say what an enacted statute
means."
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laws survive the political coalition that produced them; the legitimacy
of a statute does not depend on current public or congressional opinion.^^ The enacting Congress assumes that its action will survive.
Under the basic accountability rationale of Chevron, that is a reason
for placing primary interpretive authority with the courts rather than
with the agencies. The political result reflected in the statute will
more likely be respected by neutral courts than by accountable, politi
cally appointed agencies. Furthermore, the built-in rivalry between
the legislative and executive branches, compounded by the now-long
standing phenomenon of powers separated not only by constitutional
tasks but by political party, should raise doubt that Congress wants to
hand power over to the agencies.^^ By and large, it seems safe to say
that Congress prefers relatively stringent judicial review of agency in
terpretations. The ambiguity of so much modem legislation results
from time constraints, logrolling, and individual legislator's desire for
credit but not blame. As Justice Stevens was fully aware,it is not
the result of a conscious desire to leave policy-making to the agency.
Particularly in equating ambiguity with delegation, then. Chevron's
presumption is counterfactual.^'
In short. Chevron itself is not tme to the textualist approach.
One can find no text with that command and some, in the A?A, that
goes the other way. Any inferences as to congressional intent where it
has been silent seem also to mn counter to Chevron
Thus, while
Justice Scalia may wish Congress would command the courts to defer,
that is only his personal policy preference.
B.

Determinacy

The second problem Chevron poses for textualists is the implicit
concessions it makes about statutory indeterminacy. The understand
ings of the binding nature and the determinacy of statutory language
that are implicit in Chevron conflict with those that are explicit in
textualism. The very premise of Chevron deference is that the text
does not answer the question. It is because the statute is incomplete
22 Farber, Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 308-09 (1989).
23 Moglen & Pierce, supra note 12, at 1213.
2'* Justice Stevens did not claim that Congress consciously desired to let the agency answer
the hard questions; his point was that, whatever the explanation, that is what Congress had
done. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
25 Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 407, 445
(1989).
26 Despite his credo. Justice Scalia has also drawn such inferences in this setting. See
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 2428, 2444 (1988) (Scalia, J., concur
ring) ("Congress would naturally expect that the agency would be responsible, within broad
limits, for resolving ambiguities in its statutory authority or jurisdiction.").
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and its "interpretation" necessarily involves significant policy-making
that the (at least indirectly democratically accountable) agency rather
than the courts should do the interpreting. As long as there is an
agency around, this view of textual indeterminacy should be accept
able and workable for the textualist. But there is not always an
agency around. What is a court to do with an ambiguous statute
when there is no agency interpretation to which to defer?
The real world answer is that the court will do the best it can
with the limited and ambiguous materials at hand, searching for the
"better" of two or more plausible interpretations, and in the extreme
case strike the statute as void for vagueness or because it is simply not
"legislation."" Struggling to determine the preferable interpretation
of an unclear statute is a manageable task; it is one judges have been
performing for centuries. I do not mean to say that it cannot be done,
or even that a textualist cannot do it.^® My point is only that Chev
ron's acknowledgement that there are many statutory provisions that
are uncertain and have no obvious meaning should discomfort the
textualist. To use a term currently in vogue, and employed elsewhere
by both Professor Zeppos and Professor Strauss, Chevron's "candor"
about indeterminacy should bother Scalia because he claims that textualism is itself the most candid form of statutory interpretation."
It is in part for this reason, I think, that Justice Scalia (and other
judges of a similar stripe) are preoccupied by the meaning of "ambig
uous" in the Chevron analysis. Justice Scalia has been at pains to
point out that "ambiguous" does not require that the arguments for
conflicting interpretations are in perfect equipoise; rather, a provision
may be ambiguous even though one reading is preferable. This ad
monition takes the form of an effort to preserve Chevron's integrity
against judges who would avoid deference simply by pretending that
an ambiguous statute is clear.®' But it is also an effort to salvage the
27 See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2909 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur
ring); Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 716 F.2d 1565, 1582 (11th Cir. 1983)
(Hill, J., dissenting) (Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1495
(1982), does not "amount to legislation by the Congress" because it does nothing more than
identify a real problem and announce that it receive the "appropriate" solution), cert, denied,
469 U.S. 1228 (1985).
28 "Of course I can—as can any judge—always determine which of the parties has the
better interpretation of a statute." Silberman, Chevron—TTie Intersection of Law and Policy,
58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 826-27 (1990) (emphasis in original).
29 Strauss, 150 Cases, supra note 12, at 1124 (acknowledging, as Chevron does, "the reality
that for some purposes statutes will be indeterminate" is "healthy in its candor ); Zeppos,
Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353 (1989). See generally Shapiro,
In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987).
20 Scalia, supra note 4, at 520; see also supra note 28.
21 It is EalanroH by the opposite admonition from those who fear that judges will avoid
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textualist enterprise from the doubts cast on it by the very premise of

Chevron. In defining ambiguity as something other than hopeless un
certainty, Justice Scalia is insisting that a court can make sense of a
statute on its own if it has to. Because ambiguity is not unresolvable
equipoise, textualism remains a workable technique of statutory inter
pretation notwithstanding Chevron'^ recognition that a definite an
swer cannot always be found in the statute.
These concerns also help explain why Justice Scalia's wariness
about other judges understating ambiguity is coupled with a tendency
in his own opinions to stay in Chevron step one. Although the sample
is hardly statistically significant. Justice Scalia seems especially will
ing to strike down agency interpretations because they are inconsis
tent with the plain words of the statute.
This tendency, which
Justice Scalia has observed in himself,^^ should not be surprising, for
the textualist by definition rejects the cloud of ambiguity.
There is a second possible explanation for Justice Scalia's ten
dency to stay in Chevron step one. The step two inquiry into the "rea
sonableness" of the agency's interpretation seems to go beyond the
limits of the textualist inquiry. As former-Judge Starr, who supports
Chevron
and
tends
toward
textualism,
has
written,
" '[rjeasonableness' in this context means . . . the compatibility of the
agency's interpretation with the policy goals ... or objectives of Con
gress.
Yet Justice Scalia is not interested in inquiring into the "pol
icy goals or objectives of Congress." Thus, consideration of whether
an interpretation is "reasonable," or "not arbitrary and capricious,"
may open the door to just the sort of interpretive approach Scalia
would reject.^'
These implicit tensions between textualism and Chevron are most
interpretation simply by pretending that a clear statute is ambiguous. E.g. Young v. Commu
nity Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 988 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The task of interpret
ing a statute requires more than merely inventing an ambiguity and invoking administrative
deference.").
32 See Maislin Indus, v. Primary Steel Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990); Department of the
Treasury v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 110 S.Ct. 1623 (1990); Pittston Coal Group v.
Sebben, 109 S.Ct. 414 (1988); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1831 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying solely on statute's text. Justice
Scalia would set aside agency regulation in its entirety); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
33 "One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its
text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering re
quirement for Chevron deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me
to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt." Scalia,
supra note 4, at 521 (emphasis in original).
34 Continental Airlines v. Department of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
35 See also infra note 49 and accompanying text.
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evident if the textualist position is carried to the extreme. They are
palpable, for example, in Judge Kozinski's dissenting opinion in Mesa
Verde Construction Co. v. Northern California District Council of La
borers.In Mesa Verde, the Ninth Circuit upheld, under Chevron,
the NLRB's view that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to
repudiate a prehire agreement negotiated with the union. The diffi
culty was that the NLRB had previously taken the opposite view of
the statute, and the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court had upheld
that interpretation.^"' For the majority, both readings, although con
flicting, were permissible. So far so good.^® But there is an obvious
difficulty in first saying that the statute means one thing and now say
ing that it means the opposite.^' The statute can leave the choice be
tween X and Y to the agency, and it is generally understood that
Chevron has removed the stigma from agency flip-flops in step two
cases,'*" but the statute can only mean one or the other. This difficulty
36 861 F.2d 1124, 1146 (9th Cir. 1988) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
37 The NLRB had initially ruled that for an employer to repudiate a prehire agreement it
had negotiated with a union was an unfair labor practice; it then switched its position, then
returned to its original view. During the middle period, the Supreme Court had upheld the
Board's view that unilateral repudiation did not violate the National Labor Relations Act, Jim
McNefF, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260 (1983); NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, 434 U.S. 335
(1978), and the Ninth Circuit itself had followed those cases. The question facing the court,
therefore, was whether the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedents required that it reject
the Board's new position. The majority concluded that the previous courts had not indepen
dently construed the statute; rather, they had merely concluded that the Board's interpretation
was reasonable and consistent with the NLRA and accordingly deferred to it. Mesa Verde,
861 F.2d at 1129-30, 1134-36. The opposite interpretation might also be reasonable and con
sistent with the NLRA—such a possibility is the very premise of Chevron—and the majority
found that it was. Id. at 1131-34.
38 Chevron applies in those (frequent) situations where Congress's vagueness creates what
Peter Strauss has labelled a "zone of indeterminacy" within which the agency has a good deal
of maneuvering room. See Strauss, ISO Cases, supra note 12, at 1124. To take the issue in
Chevron itself, it is absolutely clear that the Court would also have upheld the EPA if it had
read the Clean Air Act to forbid a plantwide definition in nonattainment areas—as indeed the
Carter EPA had. The whole basis of Chevron was that Congress had nothing to say about the
bubble policy. A statewide definition of "new source" would be outside the zone of indetermi
nacy; but both a plantwide and an installation-specific definition are within it.
39 Since Mesa Verde, the Supreme Court has on at least two occassions refused to accept
new agency interpretations where it had previously upheld the agency's earlier, different read
ing. See Maislin Indus. U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2770 (1990); California v.
FERC, 110 S. Ct. 2024, 2029 (1990). The possibility of shifting statutory meaning is not incon
ceivable, depending on one's theory of statutory interpretation. Under a dynamic theory, such
a '-bange might be perfectly correct if there had been a corresponding change in the underlying
conditions that the statute addresses. See generally Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpreta
tion, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). Interestingly, the textualist might also allow a statute to
mean conflicting things over time if the literal meaning of the statutory terms has changed.
to Kg., Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. Department of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446,
1455 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 864 (1990); Starr, supra note 12, at 297-98;
Strauss, ISO Cases, supra note 12, at 1125-26.
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tripped up the dissenters, who each viewed the Supreme Court deci
sions as binding constructions of the statute.'*' Judge Kozinski's dis
sent is especially striking in the way in which it highlights the tension
between the textualist's belief in determinacy and textual meaning on
the one hand and Chevron*s acknowledgement of ambiguity on the
other. Indeed, Judge Kozinski's textualism drives him to adopt pre
cisely the rhetoric of the dioXi-Chevron camp, decrying "the abdication
of judicial responsibility."^^ Kozinski accepts that agencies can,
within statutorily defined boundaries, "change their outlook as often
and easily as a chameleon changes color.But statutory meaning is
constant and specific; "it is a fact." Thus, "[w]hen courts interpret a
statute, they search for its true meaning—and there can never be
more than one true meaning."*^
In short, the textualist's understanding of the interpretive task is
that there is one right answer, and it is found in the statute. Chevron,
at least in its acceptance of implicit delegation via ambiguity, is based
on just the opposite view. Although Judge Kozinski seems scandal
ized by the thought "that in passing laws Congress approves a range
of possible interpretations,"*^ that is precisely the theory of Chevron.
To be fair. Justice Scalia himself seems more willing to accept that a
statute may have a range of possible meanings; he has acknowledged
that under Chevron court and agency are not "searching for the one,
permanent, 'correct' meaning of the statute."*' The tension high
lighted by Judge Kozinski's Mesa Verde dissent nonetheless remains,
if less starkly, in simultaneous endorsement of textualism and a strong
version of deference to agency interpretations.
861 F.2d at 1137 (Wallace, J., dissenting), 1137-46 (Hug, J., dissenting), 1146-49
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
« Id. at 1147.
« Id. at 1146.
** Id. Judge Kozinski was fully aware of the links between Chevron step two and skepti
cism about determinate textual meaning;
[T]he court is, in effect, holding that statutes have no fixed meaning, that in pass
ing laws Congress approves a range of possible interpretations, each as good as the
next. While this approach fits in neatly with the popular mythology, conceived
and nurtured in legal academies, that words are incapable of conveying precise
concepts, it "undermines the basic principle that language proves a meaningful
constraint on public and private conduct." Needless to say, I disagree with this
approach which, in my view, represents a serious abdication of judicial
responsibility.
Id. at 1147 (citation omitted).
« Id. at 1147.
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45.
Scalia, supra note 4, at 517.
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Delegation and the Interpretive Task

The third tension (really more a mild paradox) is that textualism
and Chevron reflect profoundly different hermeneutics. For the textualist, judicial interpretation is the narrow task of the honest agent.
One need not go to the textualist extreme in pursuing the honest agent
approach; to the contrary, judges have turned to extratextual sources
such as legislative history in an effort to be faithful to the congres
sional decision that, as honest agents, they must respect. But textual
ism is perhaps the honest agent theory's purest and most constrained
expression. At the heart of the textualist's position is the conviction
that policy considerations conjured up by the courts have no place in
statutory interpretation. In utter contrast, the "interpretation" per
formed by an agency is, oddly, not that of the honest agent; it is
nontextu^st, dynamic, policy-driven. Justice Scalia calls them both
"interpretation," but they are two wholly different enterprises. Chev
ron is a major endorsement of dynamic statutory interpretation,'^® the
technique of interpretation most anathema to the textualist.
This divergence in interpretive approach is not problematic given
the divergence in interpreters. (It is problematic for the textualist in
providing another illustration—^not that one is needed—of words'
lack of fixed meaning; the dictionary does not get us very far in figur
ing out what "interpretation" is.) It is perfectly reasonable for agen
cies to pm^ue a different interpretive approach than courts. In fact,
this divergence is indispensable to the simultaneous acceptance of
Chevron and textualism. If agencies were to adopt a textualist ap
proach to statutory interpretation. Chevron would clearly be wrongly
decided; for that matter, so would Skidmore.*^ If interpretation is
really simply a matter of reading the words of the statute and identify
ing their single and necessary meaning, then any and all arguments
for deference disappear. The agency's arguably superior understand
ing of policy, of legislative intent, of legislative history are all irrele
vant to the interpretive task. First, these factors should not inform
the reading of the statute. Second, the agency need not go beyond the
••8 Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 45 (1988) (^'Chev
ron provides a major route for the updating of statutes."). See generally Eskridge, supra note
39.

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Skidmore is the usually cited description
of the pn-Chevron doctrine of nonbinding deference to agency interpretive, as opposed to
legislative, rules. Under Skidmore, agency interpretations "constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." Id. at
140. The respect owed by a court to such an interpretation "will depend upon the thorough
ness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power
to control." Id.
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statute (in which case the arguments for the comparative advantage of
agencies over courts become strongest) because the statute itself an
swers the question. The agency thus has no comparative advantage;
its democratic accountability is a liability rather than a benefit.
The necessary differences between judicial and agency interpreta
tions (at least agency interpretations under step two of Chevron) may
help explain Justice Scalia's acceptance of broad congressional delega
tions. Professor Zeppos points out that while Scalia's "textualism
suggests that he might demand greater specificity in statutory text, he
has repeatedly voted to uphold statutes against claims that they un
constitutionally delegate legislative power."'° Zeppos explains this
paradox as illustrating Scalia's bias toward executive power; Scalia
overlooks his textualist scruples if (but only if) the President benefits
from Congress's failure to make hard decisions." It is common
ground that Justice Scalia likes the executive more than Congress, so I
do not think this explanation is necessarily wrong,'^ but it is
incomplete.
First, Professor Zeppos suggests that Justice Scalia does not seem
to want to force Congress to make hard policy choices through more
specific language. That Justice Scalia does not do so directly, by strik
ing down broad delegations as unconstitutional, does not mean that
his method does not create that incentive. There is every reason for
the courts to stay out of the business of deciding when a statute is
sufficiently specific to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine, as they have
since Schechter." Justice Scalia's approach may still indirectly force
'o Zeppos, Scalia's Textualism, supra note 3, at 1639 (citing Skinner v. Mid-Atlantic Pipe
line Co., 109 S. a. 1728 (1989); Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 677 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)). One could add to this list the per curiam opinion by the three-judge District
Court in Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.) (per curiam) (three-judge court),
aff'd, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), universally assumed to have been written by then-Judge Scalia.
5t Zeppos, Scalia's Textualism, supra note 3, at 1639.
'2 It does raise the question of whether Justice Scalia really means what he says. A recur
rent question in any extended discussion of Scalia's jurisprudence, as evidenced by the papers
in this symposium, is whether Justice Scalia is sincere or is merely offering a plausible neutral
front for a highly conservative political agenda. Professor 2^ppos generally assumes Scalia's
sincerity and takes him at his word. For example, he points to inconsistencies not as proof that
Scalia is a fraud, but only to demonstrate that his method is not all it's cracked up to be. See
Zeppos, Scalia's Textualism, supra note 3, at 1623-34. This is one point in his paper where
Professor Zeppos refuses to give Scalia the benefit of the doubt and adopts a more cynical tone.
The circumstantial evidence justifying such cynicism is concededly great. To make the argu
ment fully, one should include Peter Strauss's emphasis on the phenomenon of divided govern
ment. See P. Strauss, Comment: Legal Process and Judges in the Real World, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1653, 1656 (1991).
'3 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Justice Scalia is
one of many who believe that for judges to police the specificity of congressional delegations is
a hopeless task. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
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greater specificity. As Professor Zeppos and others have pointed out,
narrow readings of statutes throw the matter back to Congress.''*
Similarly, viewing vague statutory language as a grant of broad ad
ministrative authority should also lead Congress to narrower and
more specific delegations in order to keep the agencies in check."
This is especially true in the modem era of politically divided govern
ment, when a Democratic Congress is handing authority over to Re
publican administrators.'^ Indeed, Chevron enthusiasts repeatedly
express the hope that Chevron will produce more specific legislation."
Second, it is in one way perfectly natural for the textualist to
accept delegations through vague and broadly worded legislation. As
Judge Kozinski's opinion in Mesa Verde illustrates, confidence in stat
utory meaning significantly narrows the scope of agency action.'® If
"interpretation" is understood merely as a restatement of what it is
Congress has decided, then there is little room for agency interpreta
tion. Agencies can make their own decisions only where Congress has
been silent; Congress has been silent only in its broadest delegations
or most ambiguous language.
Third, the textualists may actually need both delegation and
Chevron given their rather impoverished view of what goes into inter
preting a statute. In this view, interpretation is merely a matter of
elucidating or reformulating what Congress has already done, i.e. re
stating what the words already say. Yet interpretation has to be more
than revealing the inherent but somehow hidden meaning, like open
ing the lid of a box." Judges cannot provide the additional informa
tion and perspective, yet someone must; agencies are the obvious
someone. In other words, if one accepts the basic premises of the
("the scope of delegation is largely uncontrollable by the courts"); Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1696-97 (1975). That the Court agrees
is seen by its de facto abandonment of the nondelegation doctrine and the meaninglessness of
its black-letter "intelligible principle" rule.
Zeppos, Scalia's Textualism, supra note 3, at 1637-38.
" Professor Zeppos points out that "[o]ne can seek to 'reform' Congress not by tilting
power to the executive, but by forcing upon Congress the need to make more fundamental
policy choices at the delegation level." Id. at 1639. Given Chevron, tilting power to the execu
tive will force that need upon Congress.
See Strauss, supra note 52, at 1656-57.
" Kg., Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64
TEX. L. REV. 469, 523-24 (1985); Silberman, supra note 28, at 824 ("Congress, now aware of
the Chevron rule and perhaps distrustful of executive branch interpretation, is thereby led to
greater specificity in drafting. Such specificity is all to the good."); Starr, supra note 12, at 31112.
5® 861 F.2d at 1146; see supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
" Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 457-58
(1988); see also Sunstein, supra note 25, at 416-23.
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textualist enterprise, then the only way to ensure reasonable and valid
interpretations is to hand the task over to agencies, who are not
shackled in the same way as judges.
D.

Unplain Words

The interaction of textualism and Chevron is illuminating in one
final way. The traditional rule about consulting legislative history has
been that if the text is clear, the court need (indeed should) not look
further; only if the text is not clear should the judge consult the legis
lative history. Is this the same lack of clarity that triggers Chevron^
step two? For most of the Court—i.e., those Justices who regularly
consult legislative history—it cannot be. The Chevron question is not
whether the words are clear, but whether congressional intent is
clear.®' If the words are unclear, the Court turns to the legislative
history and the other "traditional tools of statutory construction."®'
Only if that too is unavailing does the court simply accept any reason
able agency interpretation.®^ Although the role of legislative history
after Chevron has been a matter of dispute, it remains relevant for a
majority of the current Justices. In Chevron itself, after all, the Court
looked far beyond the statute's four comers before deferring.
For Justice Scalia, on the other hand, the lack of clarity that
would trigger resort to the legislative history under the traditional
mle—i.e., enough so that the court cannot confidently interpret the
statute on the basis of its language alone—^is identical to that which
triggers Chevron^% step two. By definition there can be no resort to
the legislative history, so textual uncertainty sends the court straight
to the agency without stopping at legislative history.
In a purely consistent and logical world, this should mean that
the textualist goes to step two more often and interprets the statute
herself less often. The flow chart would ask if the text is clear; if no,
the traditional interpreter would turn to the legislative history, and
only if that too is unhelpful to the agency, whereas the textualist
should go straight to the agency. Yet Justice Scalia's class of step one
cases is no smaller, and may be larger, than that of the other Justices.
This phenomenon casts light on the textualist enterprise in general.
First, it reminds us that for the textualist, a little text goes a long
way.®^ Second, it indicates that it is misleading to describe textualism
60 Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 & n.9 (1984).
Id. at 843 n.9.
62 INS V. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), for example, was a step one case in which
the Court consulted the legislative history in light of somewhat unclear statutory language.
63 The same lesson is apparent in the numerous cases in which Justice Scalia has written
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as a "plain words" approach. The textualist acknowledges that the
the words may not be plain at all. But they will (or must) be suffi
cient. Scalia's textualism is not a plain words approach; it is just a
"words" approach. Textualism limits the inputs into judicial deci
sionmaking without limiting the output.
II. SHIFTING THE BALANCE OF POWER
Despite the many tensions between textualism and deference, the
two can comfortably coexist because both are at least presented as
doctrines of judicial restraint that limit judicial policy-making.®^ The
focus on the judge's role may obscure some of the consequences for
the roles played by the other branches. Textualism and deference to
agency interpretations are in fact closely linked in their effects on the
separation and balance of federal powers: each purports to be respect
ful of Congress, each in fact reflects a basic distrust of Congress, and
each shifts authority away from Congress.
A.

Passive-Aggressive Judging

Justice Scalia's textualism boasts a well-polished patina of re
spect for Congress. First, it rests on a strong version of legislative
supremacy. It is because the judicial role must be cabined, amounting
merely to application of the legislative niandate, that the courts must
deny themselves any tools other than the statutory text. To abandon
the constraints of text provides too many opportunities for judges to
impose their own, rather than Congress's, policy preferences.®' Sec
ond, textualism places congressional action on a pedestal. Legislative
history is irrelevant because it is not adopted via full article I proce
dures. Only the language actually voted on by both houses and
presented to the President is /aw.®® In dismissing legislative history
because it is not "law," Justice Scalia implicitly adopts a strong ver
sion of legislative supremacy: nothing is law except what Congress
separately to state that he would reach the same result on the basis of text alone that the
majority reached through consideration of the traditional range of relevant materials. Kg.,
Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 2160 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); H.J., Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Tel., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2907 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Jett v. Dallas
Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2724 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
^ AleinikoflT, supra note 48, at 45-46; Zeppos, Scalia's Textualism, supra note 3, at 161920.
65 See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2576 (1989) (Ken
nedy, J., concurring); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 670-71 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
66 E.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566-67 (1988); Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer
Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 501 (1988); Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751
F.2d 1336, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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says. Third, Scalia's treatment of the United States Code as a coher
ent, integrated, consistent whole implies a legislature of extraordinary
abilities whose work is taken seriously.®^
Chevron, too, in its literal content bows deeply to the legislature.
Its theoretical premise is that Congress itself has required the deferen
tial stance by delegating interpretive authority to the agency.®® The
court is merely carrying out Congress's command. And if Congress
has actually decided the "precise question at issue," then the Court
ignores the agency and obediently enforces the congressional deci
sion.®' Like textualism, deference is justified as a means of limiting
the influence of judges' personal policy preferences.'"
Notwithstanding this surface respect for congressional decision
making, both these doctrines rest on deep suspicion of Congress and
disdain for how it does its job. Thus, Justice Scalia's invective about
legislative history—^rehearsed colloquies, unread insertions by legisla
tive aides, and the many other "frail substitutes"" for statutory
text—is all sneering derision. As Professors Farber and Frickey put
it, the textualists' stance toward members of Congress is one of "deni
grating their integrity while exalting the product of their labors.'"^
This divergence is not so paradoxical as it seems. The exaltation of
the product is in part a consequence of the denigration of the produ
cers. Were the statute itself no more than the imperfect articulation
of the sum of seamy, log-rolling, influence-wielding, back-scratching,
uncomprehending legislative maneuvers, it would merit no respect or
attention at all. But that view is unacceptable given the basic consti
tutional scheme. So Justice Scalia saves the statute from Congress by
insisting that it has a life of its own.'® He is uninterested in legislative
intent because he is uninterested in the legislature; focusing only on
the text keeps the interpreter and the text unsoiled.''^ The United
Professor Zeppos several times refers, with evident perplexity, to Scalia's apparent as
sumption of an "omniscient" legislature. Zeppos, Scalia's Textualism, supra note 3, at 162123.
See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
Chevron, 867 U.S. at 843 n.9; see also ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 108 S. Ct. 805,
817 (1988) (declining to rely on Chevron because "the Executive Branch is not permitted to
administer the Act in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that
Congress enacted into law").
E.g., Pierce, Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretation of
Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 314 (1988).
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
•^2 Farber & Frickey, supra note 59, at 468.
•^3 The usual quotation for this idea is from Justice Holmes: "We do not inquire what the
legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." Holmes, The Theory of Legal Inter
pretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899).
In this respect. Justice Scalia seems to take a more extreme position than Judge Easter-
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States Code may resemble an elegant and finely timed clock, but it
turns out that the existence of the clock does not prove the existence
of the clockmaker.
It would be possible to have little respect (in the daily sense of
the term) for Congress and its members but still respect (in the
stricter sense) its decisions and its authority. That is not, however,
what Justice Scaha does. Consider, for example, the notion that even
if adherence to the text leads to silly results the judge's hands are tied.
Although billed as an instance of judicial restraint, this is a mock re
spect for congressional authority that is at bottom quite hostile. By
forcing Congress to rewrite statutes whose language did not quite
reach certain unanticipated situations and to be extraordinarily com
prehensive in the first place, the textualist's "restraint" only makes
Congress's task harder.'' This textualism is passive-aggressive.
Chevron too is at bottom hostile to Congress. While it purports
to respect Congress, its underlying theory contains an implicit criti
cism. Requiring deference because agencies are democratically ac
countable and the decisions involved are in essence policy matters
indicates that the interpretive question arises only because Congress
has fallen down on the job. For if, as Chevron posits, accountability is
the goal, then although we should prefer agencies to courts, we should
also much prefer Congress to agencies. Indeed, Chevron has been de
scribed as creating a "presumption of statutory ambiguity.'"® While I
think this is an overstatement, such a reading amounts to an assump
tion that Congress has failed in its constitutionally assigned task.
Thus, Justice Scalia should like Chevron because it confirms, although
very politely, his own view of legislation: Congress makes deals.
brook. Judge Easterbrook has written that the reason a judge cannot borrow from another
statute or even another section to illuminate the meaning of the provision at issue is that the
legislative process is not sufficiently coherent. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, SO U. CHI. L.
REV. 533, 547 (1983). If in fact legislative will is relevant to statutory interpretation. Judge
Easterbrook is surely right; Congress does not mean the same thing every time it uses a partic
ular word. It is only because Justice Scalia is not interested in the legislative will that he can
pretend it does. Kg., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (meaning of
"substantially justified" in the Equal Access to Justice Act indicated by use of term "substan
tial" in the Administrative Procedure Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Yet no
one, least of all Justice Scalia, views Congress as coherent and consistent. Since Justice Scalia's
big bang approach does not consider the legislative background at all, he, unlike Judge Easter
brook, can indulge in this fiction.
" 2^ppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding
Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1332 (1990) [hereinafter Zeppos, FactFinding Model]; Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpreta
tion in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 904-05 (1982).
Shapiro & Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Admin
istrative Law, 1988 DuKE L.J. 819, 859.
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hedges, seeks credit but avoids blame, and does not know what it is
doing. Finally, like textualism, extreme deference is sometimes justi
fied as a means of forcing Congress to do its job right.Not only is
this in itself critical of Congress, but for the same reasons that narrow
and literal statutory readings do Congress no favor, so Chevron may
require more of Congress than it is up to.^®
B. Growth of Executive Power
It should come as no surprise that each of these doctrines—and,
more importantly, the two of them synergistically—shifts power away
from Congress and toward the executive. Chevron by its terms in
creases executive authority. Although it seems to do so at the expense
of the judiciary, the legislature loses influence as well. First, any
growth in executive power means a loss in legislative power. Second,
however much one wants to debate the extent and the benefits of the
shift. Chevron clearly does involve a shift away from the model (and, I
think, the reality) of courts protecting congressional decisions against
agency misreadings or abandonment." Textualism, expecially in its
most literalist manifestations, also diminishes legislative authority in
subtle but significant ways.®° This is well-trodden ground. I wish
only to make a few comments about textuaUsm's impact on agency
authority.
Professor Zeppos speculates that textualism reduces legislative
power, then considers separately its effect on executive authority.®'
These issues are not distinct. Two centuries of struggle between the
President and Congress, not to mention the basic political theory unSee supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
'8 Indeed, the very commentators who extoll Chevron's incentive for specificity seem to
acknowledge that Congress may be unable to respond to the incentive. Thus, Judge Stanstates that "Congress . . . may pass fewer laws," but takes solace in the fact that "[t]hose it
does pass, however, will be better than many on the books now." Starr, supra note 12, at 312.
And Judge Silberman, having in one breath stated that Chevron will produce greater specific
ity, which is all to the good, in the next observes that "often there is also ambiguity when
statutes are extensively detailed, because the more Congress writes the more difficulty it seems
to have making legislation clear." Silberman, supra note 28, at 825.
I am among those who not only regret this shift but feel that it is in part the result of a
misreading of Chevron. That question, however, is for another day.
80 For discussion of how textualism reduces legislative authority, see Mikva, The Primacy
of Congress and the Legal System, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 193,197-98 (1990); Ross, Reaganist
Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. III. L. REV. 399, 401-02, 422-26; Wald, The Sizzling
Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United
States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 308 (1990); Zeppos, Fact-Finding Model, supra
note 75, at 1332-33; Zeppos, Scalia's Textualism, supra note 3, at 1637; Note, supra note 75, at
904-05; Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation:
How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160, 188-90.
81 Zeppos, Scalia's Textualism, supra note 3, at 1638.
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derlying the Constitution, demonstrate that where one loses power
the other automatically gains. Thus, if textualism reduces legislative
authority, that in itself answers Zeppos's next question—whether it
also "tilts power toward the executive branch."
As for that question, the critical way in which textualism may
increase agency power is by removing the constraints of other inter
pretive tools. The problem is compounded by removing this con
straint at the agency level. If indeed more content can be given to
vague statutory terms if legislative history is consulted, then by deny
ing access to this source of information about statutory meaning, tex
tualism only increases ambiguity. Under Chevron, that means
increasing the scope of agency discretion. After all, legislative history
is read not only by courts, but also by lawyers within the agency or
the Department of Justice who must advise the agency on the legality
of its intended course of action. This view, which is sketched out by
Professors Zeppos and Strauss,®^ is both overstated and
underanalyzed.
First, to the interpreter uneasy about limiting herself to text, leg
islative history looks like a significant constraint given the incomplete
ness of text as an indicator of congressional meaning. But the promise
of textualism is self-fulfilling; if one actually believes that text will
answer all questions, then it will do so.®^
Textualism as practiced by a true believer therefore will not in
crease the number of ambiguous statutes.®^ It is only if textualism is
forced on (and then sincerely applied by) nontextualists that that
would happen. If Professor Zeppos were told to look only at text, he
would probably find more ambiguous statutes and defer to agency in
terpretations more often than if he was allowed to consider other
sources of meaning. But that does not mean that Justice Scalia, or
administrative agencies, would have the same difficulties.
Second, the checking function of legislative history, although
real,®' is easily overstated. There are, to be sure, many individual
cases where a vague term is significantly clarified by a specific piece of
82 Strauss, supra note 52, at 1655-57; Symposium: Congressional Control of the Administra
tion of Government: Hearings, Investigations, Oversight, and Legislative History, 68 WASH.
U.L.Q. 595, 605-08 (1990) (remarks of Peter Strauss); Zeppos, Scalia's Textualism, supra note
3, at 1617.
^ .
83 Put more positively, the availability of legislative history may reduce the incentive to
draw all available meaning out of the text. If resort to legislative history is foreclosed, the text
may legitimately become less ambiguous because of more careful and disciplined (desperate?)
examination of it.
84 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
85 For a cogent general defense of reliance on legislative history to clarify statutory mean
ing, see Farber & Frickey, supra note 59.
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legislative history.®^ But all practicing lawyers and judges know that
one can virtually always discover something in the legislative history
to support any interpretation. Textualist judges seem particularly
(perhaps excessively) aware of the malleability and cooperativeness of
legislative history; that is part of their critique.®' It is easy to over
state the extent to which legislative history in fact performs the check
ing function Professor Zeppos attributes to it.
Third, it is not clear that Justice Scalia would endorse a textuahst
approach by agency interpreters. As I discussed above, if agencies
and judges are both to be textualists then Chevron loses all justifica
tion.®® Only a small comer of the textualist argument (viz., legislative
history is not law because it was not adopted pursuant to full article I
procedures) applies when it is an agency rather than a judge doing the
interpreting. Thus, Professors Zeppos and Strauss may be too hasty
in bemoaning the loss of the checking function of policy and history
at the agency level.
Finally, this view of the consequences of textualism with regard
to agency power has an important connection to an overall assessment
of textualism as a judicial method. If in fact legislative history does
play this critical checking function of agency interpretations, then it
does the same for judicial interpretations. If the threat of placing leg
islative history off-limits is that agencies will now have too free a
hand, implementing their own views of social policy rather than ad
hering to congressional will, then that threat is also present with re
gard to judges. When Professors Zeppos and Strauss assert that
textualism will work a shift of power to the executive because it aban
dons the limitations imposed by legislative history, implicitly they are
saying that there is an even bigger shift of power to the judiciary.
Although left unstated, this is perhaps the most fundamental criticism
of textualism that can be made, for it attacks textualism on its own
terms.
For example, the Clean Air Act instructs the Environmental Protection Agency to es
tablish ambient air quality standards at a level that will ensure, with an adequate margin of
safety, protection of "the public health." 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(l)(1988). The statute is unclear
as to just who constitutes the "public" whose health is to be protected. The Senate Report,
however, indicates that the "public" is the most sensitive group. S. REP. NO. 1196, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 10 (1970). EPA has so read the statute, and its interpretation has been upheld. Lead
Industries Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).
"Most sensitive group" is still a less than pellucid description, and this example does not show
that it is correct to turn to legislative history. It is one example among many, however, of a
vague statute whose meaning is clarified by resort to its history.
s"' See, e.g., Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559-60 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring) ("legislative history can be cited to support almost any proposition, and frequently
is").
88 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

Justice Scalia seeks an approach to judging in general and statu
tory interpretation in particular that prevents judges from simply im
plementing their own policy preferences. He would justify both
textualism and deference to agency interpretations as furthering this
goal. The two interact in curious ways, however. On the one hand,
each undercuts the other; Chevron itself is hard to justify on textualist
grounds and its implications for statutory meaning run counter to tex
tualist assumptions. On the other hand, each reinforces the other in a
sort of false piety toward legislative supremacy.

